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THE LABOR COURT IDEA 
R. W. Fleming* 
W HEN the War Labor Board first began to exert pressure on companies and unions to adopt grievance arbitration clauses 
during World War II,1 there was a considerable hesitance on both 
sides. Both groups worried that while third party decision making 
might momentarily improve productive efficiency, it would do so at 
the price of a long-run loss in institutional integrity and autonomy, 
and peace at any price held little fascination for either side. Never-
theless, grievance arbitration was accepted and gradually became the 
normal mechanism for resolving contractual disputes in the United 
States. 
Other industrialized nations have been less attracted to arbitra-
tion and instead often have established a system of labor courts. 2 The 
relative merits of the two systems thus naturally come into question. 
This question is worthy of consideration not because of Judge Hays' 
superficial and intemperate attack upon arbitration,3 but because 
collective bargaining is dynamic, rather than static, and because both 
arbitrators and arbitration are expendable if there is a better solution. 
Professor Aaron, of the UCLA Law School, and a group of European 
scholars are presently engaged in a broad study which will doubtless 
furnish us with better documented answers to this question than now 
exist, but in the meantime some of us who have a modest exposure to 
labor problems in certain European countries may engage in pre-
liminary analyses. 
I. THE SWEDISH SYSTEM 
Sweden is frequently cited as a desirable industrial relations 
model for the United States to follow. It is much smaller and more 
homogeneous than the United States, but it is highly industrialized, 
has maintained a remarkable record of full employment, and has a 
standard of living much like that found in this country. 
The Swedes first established a labor court in 1929, though its juris-
diction was increased by subsequent legislation.4 It is exclusively 
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competent to handle cases falling within its jurisdiction, and other 
courts must thus refuse to take such cases. It is essentially a trial court, 
but its decisions are final and not subject to appeal. The Swedish 
Constitution does, however, permit the Supreme Court to grant per-
mission for a new trial in cases decided by the Labor Court. The 
conditions which must be fulfilled in order to obtain a new trial are 
stringent: gross miscarriage of justice, new ·evidence of a decisive 
character, and so forth. 
The Court consists of a chairman and seven members, all of 
whom are appointed by the King. The normal term of office is three 
years, and members are usually reappointed. None but the chairman 
is full time. Three members, including the chairman and the vice-
chairman, are what we would call "public" members. Both the chair-
man and the vice-chairman must be learned in the law and have judi-
cial experience. The third "public" member must have special 
knowledge and experience in the field. The other members of the 
Labor Court are laymen-two of them representing management and 
three representing labor. The three union men do not sit simul-
taneously: one of them is from the salaried employees' organization, 
and he replaces one of the other two union members when the Court 
is considering a case involving salaried employees. Thus, there are 
never more than four laymen sitting at the same time, and the Court 
' can act when only one layman from each side is present. Nominations 
for the lay members of the Court come from the employers' associa-
tion and the union federation. This is less complicated than it would 
be in the United States, because for all practical purposes there is a 
single employers' association, a single large federation for production 
workers, and only one organization for salaried employees. Despite 
their representative character, these Court members are expected to 
be objective, and they do not view themselves as committed in ad-
vance to the position of one side or the other. The logic behind their 
appointments is to secure the benefit of their specialized knowledge 
and to create a tie between the Court and the major employer and 
employee organizations. Europeans seem to have been notably more 
successful than we have in establishing the principle that the labor 
and management members of such courts are expected to be objec-
tive, and such objectivity will not bring recrimination down around 
their heads. 5 
Since there are seven members of the Court, the four lay members 
can theoretically outvote the neutrals. At an early time this did in 
fact happen: employer and employee members once joined in an 
5. McPHERSON &: MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 52. 
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interpretation of the rules concerning the right of association and 
produced an opinion very unfavorable to the syndicalist unions. 
However, complaint was made to the Ombudsman, that guardian of 
rights against the civil authorities about whom we have heard so 
much in this country lately, 6 and the Court then unanimously swung 
into line. 
In the early years, dissenting opinions showed up in approxi-
mately forty per cent of the cases, but at the present time they are 
said to run more nearly ten to seventeen per cent. Labor dissents 
are more common than those from the management members, but it 
must be noted that almost ninety percent of the cases are brought to 
the court by workers. This is not strange since in Sweden, as in 
the United States, the employer is normally free to act, subject to a 
protest on the part of the union or the employee. 
The rules of procedure before the Labor Court are relatively 
simple.7 The chairman convenes a preliminary meeting of the parties 
before the actual hearing. He does not, however, attempt to en-
courage a settlement; rather, the principal purpose of the meeting 
is to weed out the issues and to be sure that the parties know what 
they are going to present. In advance of the hearing, each party sub-
mits a statement of his case: the aggrieved party files a complaint 
which is answered by the other side within a period of two or three 
weeks. The complainant may respond to the answer, and the other 
side may file an additional response, so that four papers-two from 
each side-may be in the hands of the Court members before the 
hearing is held. No party is permitted to add new materials at the 
hearing. The Court could, on its own motion, adjourn in order to 
permit the examination of alleged new evidence, but this power 
is more academic than real, since the problem rarely occurs. No 
transcript is made in a routine Labor Court case, but law clerks 
(young men attached to the Court) take notes of the testimony of 
witnesses and then prepare a summary. After the hearing, the mem-
bers of the Court convene in executive session to discuss the deci-
sion. If they are able to agree, the chairman is asked to have a draft 
of the decision prepared. The law clerks frequently help in the 
drafting of decisions; once such a draft is prepared it is circulated 
to the members for approval. Frequently the decision is approved 
without a further meeting of the Court, but, in more complex cases, 
6. See generally GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN (1966); GELLHORN, O:MBUDS· 
MEN AND OTHERS (1966). 
7. For this and other information, the author is indebted to Johan Von Holten, 
Assistant Director of the Swedish Employers' Confederation, and Stig Gustafsson, Legal 
Adviser to the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions, for time they spent with him 
in Stockholm in the summer of 1965. 
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several drafts reflecting different points of view may be prepared 
and the members then meet to thrash out a decision. The format of 
the decisions is not unlike our own arbitration opinions and awards. 
Costs are assessed at the end of a case and consist principally of 
Ia-wyers' fees and expenses for the witnesses. Under Swedish law, 
the losing side may be asked to assume the lawyers' fees incurred by 
the winning side, but the employer and employee federations, which 
frequently represent the parties, usually decline to ask for costs unless 
they believe that the other side has proceeded with a case which is 
without merit for the purpose of harassment. It is hard to get esti-
mates of the cost of a typical Labor Court case, but informants 
suggested that it might run somewhere between 800 and 1200 krona, 
which at the present exchange rate would be roughly $150 to $235. 
It apparently takes between two and three months from the time an 
average complaint is filed to the date of the hearing, and then another 
four to six weeks before the decision is released.8 Most of the hear-
ings are held in Stockholm, even though the case may arise in some 
other part of the country. 
The exact jurisdiction of the Swedish Labor Court is not easy to 
describe, but in general it is oriented toward the collectiv~ agree-
ments, as is arbitration in this country. The Swedes have, however, 
resolved without difficulty one problem that has always given us 
trouble: the right of the individual to process his grievance despite 
the disinterest or unwillingness of his union.9 In Sweden, the in-
dividual can carry his case forward if he wishes.10 
The case load of the Labor Court is not very heavy. During the 
first nventy-four years it handled 2,858 cases, an average of about 
120 cases per year.11 Once certain key principles were enunciated, 
the strong employer and employee federations settled many disputes 
without referring to the court. Many of the current cases are said 
to involve small employers which have contracts with the unions, 
but which are not members of the employers' federation. 
So much for the broad surface manifestations of the Swedish 
Labor Court. The picture is inadequate, but the overall outline 
is clear. It would not be unreasonable to conclude at this point that 
the Swedish Labor Court and the American voluntary grievance 
8. For this information, the author is indebted to Richard Peterson who spent the 
summer of 1965 in Stockholm while working on his Wisconsin Ph.D. thesis. 
9. Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement-
A Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421, 453 (1963). 
10. The United States Supreme Court has recently decided that an individual em-
ployee does not have an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration. 
Vaca v. Sipes, 35 U.SL. WEEK 4213 (Feb. 27, 1967). 
11. SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 42. 
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arbitration tribunal serve much the same function, and that which 
forum one prefers may be a matter of taste. Both appear to be 
..,oriented toward collective bargaining, the arbitration board is 
frequently tripartite for the same reason as is the Court (but with a 
different tradition as to objectivity from its members), both tribunals 
tend to be informal (though the Court appears to be better organized 
than the ad hoc arbitration hearing), the Court firmly espouses the 
adjudicatory approach which many feel should characterize the 
arbitration tribunal, and the Court seems to be more successful in 
achieving expeditious hearings at a lower cost. This last point may 
be due as much to the kinds of cases which come before the Court 
(about which more will be said later) as to the fact that the state picks 
up the bill for the judges. 
Even without probing below the surface, however, it is clear that 
an attempt to transplant the Swedish Labor Court system into the 
United States would raise significant problems. The case load of the 
Court is low by comparison with what it would have to be in this 
country, and it would be impossible to make Washington the coun-
terpart of Stockholm for the purpose of holding all the hearings. 
Some kind of regional system would have to be established in Amer-
ica, and in our federal framework this might be troublesome. Even 
more fundamental problems result from the fact that the industrial 
relations framework in the two countries, about which nothing has 
been said so far, is vastly different. Over a period of time each 
country evolves its o·wn institutions and they are, like human beings, 
partly a product of their environment. Thus, in order to have any 
understanding of the true role of the Labor Court in Sweden, one 
must first take an overall look at the pattern of industrial relations 
in that country. 
A principal characteristic of the Swedish system of industrial rela-
tions is that it is based much more upon agreement than upon legisla-
tion.12 Such a system presupposes powerful federations, and this is 
exactly what one finds. One big bargaining association dominates 
each side. The Swedish Employers' Confederation (SAF) represents 
the employers, and the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) 
represents the employees. The union confederation got started first, 
in 1898, with the immediate objective of organizing and administer-
ing a joint strike insurance fund. The employers responded, in 1902, 
by establishing a confederation of their own, and it too was a sort 
of mutual insurance society. A few tumultous years followed in 
12. JOHNSTON, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SWEDEN: A STUDY OF THE LABOUR MARKET 
AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 115-75 (1962). 
1556 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:1551 
which the employers were particularly suspicious of the tie between 
the union confederation and the Labor Party, particularly since the 
communists had not yet split off to form their own party. Neverth~ 
less, in 1906 the employer and union confederations did reach an 
agreement at the national level which has been the basis of their 
system of employer-employee relations ever since. This so-called 
"December Compromise" consisted of three basic points: 
I. the mutual recognition 0£ the right to organize; 
2. the recognition by the union confederation of the right of the 
employer to direct and distribute the work of his enterprise, and 
to engage and dismiss workers regardless of whether they be-
longed to a particular union, or to no union at all; and 
3. the tacit understanding of the two confederations that both would 
insist on the right of employers and workers to fix wages and 
other terms of employment by means of free bargaining. 
In 1936, the first point in the above compromise was incorporated 
in legislation. This extended that part of the agreement beyond the 
sphere of the two confederations, which did not, in and of themselves, 
cover the entire economy. Point two has been made a part of the 
constitution of the employer:;' confederation, so that every collective 
contract to which an SAF affiliate is a party must contain, a clause 
safeguarding the management rights enumerated in the December 
Compromise. Over the years there have been some modifications in 
this clause, as will be shown later, but it remains substantially intact 
and is a point of significance in any comparison between the Swedish 
and American dispute tribunals because it plays a large role in deter-
mining the kinds of cases which come before the Swedish Labor 
Court. 
Since the two powerful confederations play so important a part in 
Swedish industrial relations, it is necessary to say a brief word about 
them. The employers' confederation consists of approximately forty-
four national trade associations which employ over one-third of the 
total work force of Sweden. According to the constitution of the SAF, 
an individual employer becomes a part of the confederation by join-
ing one of the national trade associations. Moreover, all applications 
for membership in an association have to be approved by the SAF. 
Unlike the practice in the United States, where collective agreements 
are typically signed by the employer and the union, collective agree-
ments in Sweden are, as a rule, signed by the associations on behalf 
of their members, and the SAF has a considerable amount to say 
about such agreements. The agreement must be approved by the 
SAF before being signed by either an association or an employer. 
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The SAF may even instruct an individual employer on the solution 
of a particular problem which is deemed to have importance beyond 
the employer's individual situation, though this power is rarely 
used. Discipline within the employers' confederation is maintained 
in a variety of ways. There is a mutual insurance fund to which a 
member can be denied access if the loss results from an unauthorized 
lockout or a strike provoked by unjustified action on his part. Fur-
thermore, an association or individual employer is liable for a heavy 
fine or expulsion if it violates the SAF constitution or a decision 
rendered by the SAF in conformity with that constitution. On the 
affirmative side, the SAF has the power to order a lockout on behalf 
of a part or all of its membership. 
The union confederation includes approximately forty-two na-
tional unions. Its central powers are less than those of the SAF, 
but it does have the right to be represented in every union negotia-
tion and to make proposals if it wishes. The LO may also deny 
strike benefits out of its mutual insurance fund to any union which 
rejects a proposal put forth by the LO for the purpose of ending a 
dispute. In principle, the decision to accept a contract or to strike 
rests with the particular union, but before striking the union must, 
on pain of being denied access to the joint fund, apply to the LO for 
a special authorization to strike if the strike would involve more than 
three per cent of the union's membership. 
It is apparent from the above that in Sweden both employer and 
union confederations represent a centralized power in collective 
bargaining which has no counterpart in the United States. This 
special structure obviously has an impact upon the handling of 
grievances. Moreover, unlike the rule in the United States, the courts 
in Sweden have held that a collective contract is binding not only 
upon the organizations, but also upon their individual members. 
Thus, a breach of the contract exposes the offender to civil law suits 
for damages. Early in the twentieth century, strikes were more 
frequent and the legal recourse of employers (since the injunction 
was not available) was to bring the offenders before the general law 
courts, where the proceeding might last for several years before the 
Supreme Court finally decided the case. By 1929, contract violations 
were sufficiently serious to cause the Parliament to establish the 
Labor Court. This legislation, in addition, provided that the parties 
to a collective agreement are bound to refrain from certain kinds of 
coercive conduct during the life of the contract. Thus, from the very 
outset, the Labor Court in Sweden was far more than a tribunal 
designed to resolve differences over the interpretation of collective 
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bargaining contracts. Moreover, although private arbitration does 
exist in Sweden, and is in fact contemplated by the legislation, it 
cannot be used to bypass the Labor Court in contract breach or in-
validation cases. 
This sketchy outline of collective bargaining in Sweden, and the 
role which the powerful confederations play, is obviously inadequate 
to do more than suggest some of the difficulties in trying to compare 
American grievance arbitration and the Swedish Labor Court, but 
it may help to emphasize points of difference. A point which remains 
to be made, and which requires explanation, is that the jurisdiction 
of the Labor Court is in some senses immensely broader than that of 
the arbitration tribunal. On the other hand, the Labor Court does 
not handle many kinds of disputes which constitute the bulk of the 
business before American arbitrators. 
In the United States, organizational problems (which for all 
practical purposes means organizational problems on the union side, 
since we do not have many organizational problems with manage-
ment) involve unfair labor practices which are within the jurisdic-
tion of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). On occasion, a 
state labor relations board may be involved in similar cases. Sweden 
has no counterpart to the NLRB, and organizational cases go to 
the Labor Court. Additionally, in the United States, certain kinds 
of wage problems-minimum rates, maximum hours, and overtime 
pay-would be covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act and would 
be enforceable by the Secretary of Labor in the federal courts. 
Similar cases in Sweden would come before the Labor Court. 
Finally, as mentioned above, in Sweden the collective agreement is 
binding not only upon the corporate parties, but also upon the 
individual members; whereas, in the United States, the status of the 
individual vis-a-vis the collective contract is much more ambiguous.13 
Thus, Swedish Labor Court has an effective weapon against coercive 
tactics, such as strikes and boycotts. In the United States, some of 
these tactics would properly fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, 
others could come before state or federal courts, and a few might 
come before arbitrators. Damage suits against individual union 
members would be almost wholly ineffective in American courts, 
and damage suits against unions have, ·with some exceptions, been 
tactical maneuvers rather than real attempts at getting monetary 
awards. 
Perhaps more important, however, than the items handled by 
the Labor Court and not by American arbitrators, are the items 
13. See FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRAnoN PROCESS 107-33 (1965). 
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which constitute the bulk of the business before arbitrators but 
which do not come before the Labor Court. In theory, both have 
jurisdiction over interpretations of the collective agreement. In fact, 
several of the most contentious issues on the American scene do not 
come before the Swedish Labor Court at all. Indeed, as a rough ap-
proximation, it seems likely that about sixty per cent of the issues 
which come before arbitrators in the United States do not come to 
the Labor Court in Sweden. Thus, in a 1957 sample of American 
Arbitration Association cases, roughly twenty-five per cent of the 
total were discipline and discharge cases, approximately seventeen 
per cent were seniority items, and another twenty per cent involved 
such things as job evaluation, incentives, and union security.14 As a 
general rule, none of these items comes to the Labor Court. Seniority 
is simply not a concept which has been embodied in Swedish collec-
tive bargaining contracts. It is apparently practiced to a certain ex-
tent, but it is not provided for by contract. Doubtless, one reason for 
this is that the Swedes have been extraordinarily successful in main-
taining full employment, so that a worker has little difficulty in find-
ing a new job. Another and more fundamental reason, which applies 
equally to the other issues mentioned above, is that another forum 
is available for handling such disputes. 
As was said earlier, a principal characteristic of the Swedish indus-
trial relations system is that, starting with the December Compromise 
of 1906, it has relied more upon agreement than upon legislation. In 
1938, the December Compromise was amplified into what was known 
as the "Basic Agreement"; it has been amended since then in 194 7, 
1958, and 1964. The agreement calls for the creation of a Labor 
Market Council on which the SAF and the LO have equal represen-
tation. Normally there are three regular representatives and six 
alternates from each side. On occasion, the Labor Market Council 
sits as an arbitration tribunal and, when it does, an impartial chair-
man (usually the chairman of the Labor Court acting in a private 
capacity) is appointed jointly by the SAF and the LO. One need 
only look at the charter of the Labor Market Council, which is a 
wholly private organization perched at the pinnacle of the Swedish 
collective bargaining structure, to understand its importance and to 
put the role of the Labor Court in better perspective. The Basic 
Agreement is too long to outline in detail, but in brief it gives the 
bipartite Labor Market Council jurisdiction over the following: 
contract negotiations; the right of either party to terminate an em-
14. Procedural and Substantive Aspects of Labor-Mana~eme1it Arbi(rqtion, 1~ ARB. 
J. (n.s.) 131 (1957). 
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ployment contract of indefinite duration; the right to lay off labor 
due to a shortage of work; coercive acts by either party; conflicts 
threatening essential public services. 
The 1906 agreement established the principle that the employer 
is entitled to engage and dismiss workers at his mm discretion. Fairly 
early in its existence, the Labor Court interpreted this principle to 
mean that a dismissed worker could not bring the matter before 
the Labor Court or any other court. Thus discharge cases, which are 
so common before American arbitrators, do not come to the Labor 
Court. This is a rather shocking idea to those who are accustomed 
to American industrial jurisprudence, because one of the prime 
benefits of the collective agreement in America is generally thought 
to be the protection that it gives the individual against arbitrary or 
unjust discharge. In practice, however, the situation in Sweden is 
not quite as it may sound. In the first place, the fact that there has 
been full employment in Sweden means that it has been relatively 
easy for the dismissed worker to find another job. Second, the bar-
gaining relationship between the two giant federations is such that 
their members are unlikely to behave capriciously. Third, the Labor 
Market Council is empowered, when a discharge case is referred to 
it, to award damages to the worker if it finds that there were no 
material grounds for dismissing him.15 
A somewhat similar situation prevails with respect to reductions 
in force. If the employer implements a proposed reduction, the labor 
side can bring this to the Labor Market Council. Once the dispute 
is before the Council, the agreement provides: 
In its appraisal of the action the Council shall pay due considera-
tion both to the extent to which production is dependent on the 
skill and suitability of the labor employed and to the worker's legiti-
mate interest of security of employment. Accordingly, consideration 
shall be given to the necessity for the employer to be served, so far 
as is possible, by skilled labor suited for the job. Further, when the 
choice is between workers of equal skill or suitability, the length 
of service of the individual worker and also any especially heavy 
family obligations he must meet shall be borne in mind. 
The Council shall seek to arrive at a concerted opinion in judg-
ing disputes referred to it, and to devise means for settling the differ-
ences between the contesting parties. Any decision upheld by the 
majority of the Council shall be communicated to the trade federa-
tions concerned, and it shall rest with the latter, in consultation with 
the SAF and the LO, respectively, to resort to any such measure as 
may be prompted by the decision.16 
15. Basic Agreement Between the Swedish Employers' Confederation and the Con-
federation of Swedish Trade Unions, chapter III, article 4. 
16. Id. chapter m, lll"ticle 7. 
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Union security cases, which are not frequently heard by American 
arbitrators, are totally absent in the Swedish set-up, because the 1906 
agreement provided that an employer could hire a worker regardless 
of whether he belonged to a particular union or to no union at all. 
Since this early agreement still obtains, if an employer who is bound 
by a closed shop contract wishes to join the SAF, he is required to re-
move this provision from the contract. The LO, true to the Decem-
ber Compromise, will see that the union does so. 
Incentives are important in the Swedish industrial complex, and 
some sixty-five per cent of the workers are on some sort of piecework. 
But once again, disputes in this area are handled by a special tribunal 
set up by the SAF and the LO. A separate agency, called the "Time 
and Motion Study Board" is assigned the following tasks: 
a. following and furthering collaboration in questions relating to 
time and motion studies, as well as time and motion study 
councils, and promoting a sound and suitable practice of time 
and motion studies; 
b. handling and deciding, as an arbitration board, disputes concern-
ing, first, the validity or the meaning of the provisions contained 
in this agreement; secondly, the question whether certain proce-
dures conflict with these provisions; and, thirdly, the conse-
quences entailed by procedures that are found to be conflicting.17 
The Time and Motion Study Board is composed of three members 
from each of the organizations, plus an equal number of deputies. 
The SAF and the LO agree upon an impartial chairman for a period 
of three years. 
In addition to the Labor Market Council and the Time and Mo-
tion Study Board, there are other ways in which the SAF and the LO 
cooperate in establishing joint panels for one purpose or another, 
but they are not immediately relevant to the subject at hand.18 
II. SOME CONCLUSIONS .ABOUT THE SWEDISH LABOR COURT 
Having now looked briefly at the Swedish Labor Court, both as to 
organization and operation, and at the overall bargaining structure 
and industrial relations climate in Sweden, we can, with a much 
better perspective, return to the question of how labor courts com-
pare with the American labor arbitration tribunal. 
Initially, if the labor court is viewed in isolation, it is possible to 
conclude that it and the arbitration tribunal serve much the same 
function, namely, to resolve differences over the meaning and in-
17. Agreement Concerning Time and Motion Studies Concluded by Swedish Em-
ployers' Confederation and Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions, article 5. 
18. JoHNsrON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 216. 
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terpretation of collective bargaining contracts. There are even com-
mon philosophical tenets: the tribunal should be tripartite; the 
proceedings should be informal; appeals may be taken or decisions 
reviewed on extremely limited grounds; and the mediation function 
is generally subordinated to the adjudicatory function. 
As we have seen, however, there are below the surface very im-
portant differences between the Swedish Labor Court and the Ameri-
can arbitration tribunal. For one thing, the Labor Court has juris-
diction over matters that in this country would typically come before 
the NLRB or the courts. For another, issues which in America would 
constitute the major part of the business before arbitrators do not 
come to the Labor Court at all. Significantly, this is because the 
Swedes have created other agencies, such as the Labor Market Coun-
cil and the Time and Motion Study Board, to handle such problems; 
and these agencies are, in case of disagreement, essentially private 
arbitration boards set up under the aegis of the parties to the con-
tract. Stated differently, what the Swedes have done is to take the 
issues which would normally come to arbitration in the United 
States and send them to bipartite review boards which can, in the 
event of disagreement, turn themselves into impartial arbitration 
boards. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to jump to the con-
clusion that any attempt to compare the labor court, in a country 
like Sweden, with grievance arbitration in America is misleading 
and that the real comparison should be between grievance arbitra-
tion and the Labor Market Council or the Time and Motion Study 
Board. The fact is that, while the Swedes have a formula for turning 
their bipartite boards into tripartite boards for the purpose of resolv-
ing deadlocked disputes, they rarely have to resort to this procedure. 
Thus, there is more arbitration in theory than in practice, and if 
one attempted to compare the experience in Sweden with the ex-
perience in America, he would find almost no cases in Sweden. 
One could conclude from all this that any attempt to compare 
grievance arbitration in America with similar institutions in Sweden 
is an exercise in futilty. The Labor Court is not really the same kind 
of an animal, and the Swedish arbitration boards are more theoretical 
than real, simply because the parties find it unnecessary to use them 
to any substantial degree. But there is a difference between saying 
that comparisons are difficult and saying that there are no lessons 
to be learned. Whether the Swedes have anything to learn from us, 
I leave to them. Clearly, in my view, we have some things to learn 
from them. 
First, their bargaining confederations, while operating in a much 
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smaller geographical area and a much less complex industrial eco-
nomy than exist in the United States, exercise a degree of industrial 
statesmanship and discipline which is hard to find in this country. 
It may be that some of the strife now found on the labor-management 
scene in the United States could be alleviated if we were to develop 
larger bargaining units with greater powers of discipline. This is 
one of the factors which makes it possible for the Swedes to handle 
so many of their conflicts over contract interpretations on a bipartite 
basis. 
Second, the collective bargaining climate in Sweden tolerates, 
and indeed expects, objective participation on the part of all the 
partisan members on the court or in the arbitration process. On 
the other hand, any objectivity from partisan members of an Ameri-
can arbitration tribunal is generally covert. This is not to suggest 
that there is anything subversive about the American approach; it is 
simply to say that the traditions in the two countries are different. Per-
haps in the last analysis it makes no difference, since the underlying 
philosophy of having partisan members may be simply to gain the 
advantage of their expertise and greater familiarity with the job. 
Since that can be obtained whether or not partisan members ulti-
mately dissent from an award, it may not be of great significance 
that partisan members in America do not pretend to be objective. 
On the other hand, wear and tear on neutral members of arbitra-
tion tribunals would often be saved if their colleagues were in a 
position to take a completely objective view of the issues without 
respect to the feelings of their constituents. 
Third, there are procedural standards set by the Swedish Labor 
Court which are clearly superior to those found in most of our ad hoc 
arbitration situations. The Labor Court does have a preliminary 
hearing, not for the purpose of mediating the issue but in order to 
clarify the issue and to sharpen the presentation. No complaint is 
more familiar among American ad hoc arbitrators than that the 
parties so often badly prepare and present their cases. Additionally, 
costs are kept low and the time-lag is not serious under the Swedish 
procedure. 
Fourth, the delicate problem of whether to permit the individual 
to bring an action which the union either opposes or is unwilling 
to process has been resolved in favor of the individual, and no serious 
damage to the collective relationship has resulted.19 (It should be 
noted that the circuits are now in conflict on whether it is an unfair 
labor practice for a union unfairly to refuse to prosecute a grievance; 
19. Summers, supra note 9. 
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if the NLRB is upheld in its view that this constitutes an unfair labor 
practice, we may have a remedy in this country.20) 
If these general observations about grievance arbitration in Amer-
ica and the Labor Court in Sweden are valid, a legitimate question 
remains as to whether Sweden is sufficiently illustrative of the general 
labor court pattern in W estem Europe to justify generalizations. A 
recently published book on the French labor courts throws some light 
on that question because it includes some material on such other 
European labor courts as the ones in Austria, Germany, Belgium, 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.21 There are major varia-
tions among the European labor courts in both structure and proce-
dure. Several, for instance, rely heavily on mediation techniques, 
although, as has already been pointed out, the Swedish Court does not. 
However, there are also many common denominators, including a 
wish to accelerate decisions, reduce expenses, and rely, at least in 
part, on lay members who come from the contending parties. Thus, 
in at least four broad areas it does seem possible to generalize about 
labor courts in Europe. 
First, the jurisdiction of the court normally includes areas beyond 
the pale of the grievance arbitrator in America. Almost nowhere else 
is there a counterpart of the NLRB or of the wage machinery under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act; their functions are absorbed, insofar 
as they exist, by the labor court. In addition, some matters are 
brought to the labor court in Europe which would come before civil 
courts in America. 
Second, many subjects which constitute a large segment of the 
grievance arbitrator's load do not come to the labor court. Probably 
the most important example is the firm rule of law in most European 
countries that the court is without power to order the reinstatement 
of an individual who has been unfairly discharged. The most that 
such an individual can expect is damages. The individual who is 
dismissed may in all probability be entitled to severance pay, but 
what Americans would consider to be the most appropriate remedy, 
reinstatement, is not available. 
Third, labor courts invariably have lay members from labor and 
management, and the principle that these members are expected to 
be unbiased is now well established. France illustrates this aspect in 
the most spectacular fashion by having a labor court which is bipar-
tite, though there is a provision to add a neutral member from the 
20. Cf. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 362 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Local 12, Rubber 
Workers v. NLRB, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966). 
21. McPHERSON & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2-7. 
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local judiciary in case of deadlock.22 At an early date, a struggle took 
place in France over the freedom of the lay members to vote objec-
tively, rather than voting on the instructions of their respective 
constituents, and it was ultimately made illegal for the parties to in-
struct court members. 
Fourth, under the labor court system, workers may normally bring 
cases whether or not they are members of the union and whether or 
not they are covered by a collective agreement. This is so partly be-
cause some benefits which one would derive from the collective agree-
ments in America are provided by statute in Europe, and partly 
because, as McPherson and Meyers explain: 
[T]he agreements are typically negotiated not by single employers 
but by employers' associations. They apply to the establishment of 
all member firms in the particular industry for a region or, more 
frequently, the nation. The negotiating associations normally have 
a comprehensive membership that includes many establishments 
where only a minority of the workers are organized, except in the 
Scandinavian countries, where few such establishments can be found. 
Consequently, a number of firms are subject to the agreement that 
would not, in the American context, negotiate with a union. 
Second, most European countries provide by law for the com-
pulsory extension of agreements under certain circumstances to 
establishments that were not originally parties to it. The typical 
provision is that the government, at the request of the parties to an 
agreement that was applicable originally to a large majority of the 
employees in an industry, will extend to the entire industry, within 
the area covered, those parts of the agreement that relate directly 
to the terms of employment.2a 
III. CONCLUSION 
From the preceding analysis, it is fairly evident that European 
labor courts do not offer a ready alternative to the American griev-
ance arbitration tribunal. They do not serve the same function, nor 
do they exist in the same industrial relations climate. They can, of 
course, provide some valuable lessons. Most of all, however, the 
comparative exercise should serve to remind all of those who have 
a stake in the grievance arbitration system that its long-run viability 
depends upon its capacity to change. Institutions, like individuals, 
are forever called upon to meet new problems under new and differ-
ent conditions. 
More than anything else, grievance arbitration needs a system of 
self-examination and self-renewal, and this can only be done by a 
joint enterprise in which arbitrators, labor, management, and the 
22. Id. at 48. 
23. Id. at 5. 
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appointing agencies participate. I once suggested that this might be 
done by borrowing from the courts the idea of the "judicial confer-
ence."24 The suggestion was not well understood by non-lawyers 
because the word "conference" sounded like it meant some kind of 
periodic meeting similar to that of the annual meetings of the Na-
tional Academy of Arbitrators. The word "committee" would have 
been better understood. The purpose of the judicial conference is 
simply to give advice upon the needs of the circuits and upon other 
matters concerning the administration of justice in the courts of 
the United States. The analogous "arbitration conference" would 
give advice on the needs of grievance arbitration tribunals and upon 
other matters concerning the administration of the voluntary arbi-
tration system in the United States. The work of the judicial confer-
ence is done through committees which are composed of judges, 
practicing lawyers, and scholars. The work of the arbitration con-
ference would likewise be done through committees composed of 
arbitrators, experienced representatives of labor and management, 
and scholars. 
Two very practical problems stand in the way of establishing an 
arbitration conference-assuming, of course, that the idea is a good 
one in the first place. The first is that there is no counterpart of the 
statutory framework which brings the judicial conference into being; 
the second is that the United States Treasury is not available to 
pay the expenses which would be incurred. As to the first, since 
grievance arbitration is private, the framework for the arbitration 
conference should logically remain private. This implies that labor 
and management, more specifically companies and unions, must be 
sufficiently interested in the idea to give it financial support. If they 
are, a ready administrative mechanism should not be hard to find. 
The American Arbitration Association, with its network of regional 
offices, is already in existence. Alternative possibilities would be to 
establish a program under the auspices of the National Academy of 
Arbitrators, or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The 
Academy is not presently equipped to carry out such a function, 
and perhaps should not undertake it. The Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service could do the job; however, if it did, the task 
would lose something of its private character. This is not necessarily 
fatal, and it may be that the Service should both act as the catalytic 
agent for such a program and obtain the support for it from public 
funds. 
24. FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 13, at 199. 
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In the last analysis, the question is not whether a mechanism can 
be found for carrying out the proposed purpose of an arbitration 
conference, but whether there is a felt need for it. The argument 
that there is rests on tvva propositions: (1) the rule that institutions 
remain viable and socially constructive only insofar as they build 
in a capacity for change; and (2) the observable fact that there are 
many areas of the arbitration process which need exploration and 
fresh thinking. Enumeration of a few of these areas may be helpful 
in making the point. 
Grievance systems which lead ultimately to arbitration are often 
deficient in at least two respects: :first because the screening mecha-
nism is inadequate, and second because the issues remain ill-defined, 
or are badly presented. The implications of poor screening and ill-
defined, badly presented grievances are great, both for the relation-
ships of the parties and for the acceptability of impartial decision-
making. Those who want to make the arbitration tribunal a re-
spected last step in the grievance procedure would do well to join 
in improving the preliminary steps, because the output of the arbi-
trator, like that of the computer, is heavily dependent on the nature 
of the input. 
Despite a great deal of discussion of the subject, we do not yet 
know how we should handle individual rights under the collective 
agreement. Some argue that the individual should have a vested 
right in the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract; 
others believe that the union must be allowed to refuse to process 
grievances so long as it acts in good faith; and still others think that 
the individual should be permitted to force the union to take griev-
ances involving "critical job interests" to arbitration.25 Meanwhile, 
the courts and the NLRB are troubled by the same problem. Perhaps 
it is best that the problem be left to the courts or to the NLRB, but 
until a clear resolution of the issue is made, it will remain a prickly 
thorn for arbitrators and for the parties to the collective agreement. 
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court in recent years, 
mostly in connection with section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, have 
greatly expanded the sphere of influence of the arbitrator. One 
result of this has been that the arbitrator has been asked to play a 
more active role with respect to contract enforcement than in the 
past. Specifically, damages and the injunction, which were once 
25. See generally Aaron, The Individual's Legal Rights as an Employee, 86 U.S. 
MONTHLY LABOR REv. 666 (1963); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: 
Union-Management Activity Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 631 
(1959); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1956). 
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practically solely in the province of the courts, now frequently ap-
pear before the private arbitrator. Their very presence may inject 
a new note of contention into the arena. The parties have it within 
their power to define the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, and, for that 
reason alone, some thoughtful consideration should be given to how 
much and what kinds of power they want the arbitrator to have. 
Furthermore, recent decisions of the NLRB and the courts have 
resulted in new and unexplored areas of overlap or interaction be-
tween those tribunals and the arbitration process. A good example 
is the Supreme Court's decision in the Westinghouse case,26 which 
cleared the way for arbitrators to resolve grievances between a com-
pany and one union even though such resolution might have an 
impact upon a second union not a party to the proceeding. Some 
interesting experimentation with "trilateralism" has resulted, but 
the question of how arbitrators' decisions and orders of the NLRB 
are to be made compatible remains. This example could be repeated 
in other areas, and it suggests that there should be a continuing 
examination of the inter-relationship of the various tribunals. 
It may also be time to re-evaluate the role played by partisan 
members of the arbitration board. At the moment, the pattern ranges 
from total disregard of the contractual provision which calls for the 
appointment of such members to nomination of the partisan mem-
bers after the case has been heard. In any event, we have no tradition 
of impartiality among our representative members. Perhaps this is 
not important, but it is relevant to the question of what role such 
members are supposed to play. As the make-up of labor courts in 
Europe shows, there is a fairly widespread conviction, which is shared 
in this country, that industrial tribunals will serve a more useful 
function if their membership includes representatives of both labor 
and management. If this is a sound conception, the anticipated ad-
vantages to be derived from partisan members should not go by 
default. 
In summary, the thrust of my argument is that there is nothing 
sacred about our present system of grievance arbitration; that it 
will remain a useful institution only insofar as it adjusts to new times 
and new circumstances; that its capacity to make this adjustment will 
be enhanced by the existence of a mechanism such as the arbitration 
conference; and that in the long-run the reward from this approach 
will be greater than from trying to shift to a labor court system taken 
from another context. 
26. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964). 
